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SUPREAM..COURT REVIEW (1972)
a court order warranting the surveillance. If the
witness in that situation were allowed full dis-
closure and a suppression hearing in the face of
the evidence of legality, the result would be un-
reasonable delay of grand jury proceedingsY2 Thus,
if the government establishes by warrant that
the surveillance did not violate the procedures of
Title III or the requirements of the fourth amend-
ment, further proceedings only delay already over-
loaded judicial processes.
However, instead of admitting a surveillance
which may or may not be legal, the government
may flatly deny any surveillance of the witness.
This was the situation in Egan, and Justice White
and the dissent agree that in the face of the govern-
ment denial the matter must end, and the witness
must answer or be charged with contemptY3
'A Id.
72 Id. at 71. See Russo v. United States, 404 U.S. 1210(1971). In Russo, Justice Douglas refused to stay a
contempt sentence for refusal to answer questions
before a grand jury. The petitioner claimed a §2515
"StoP and Frisk" Revisited:
Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972)
In Adas v. Williams i the Supreme Court ex-
panded the stop and frisk concept which it first
enunciated four years ago in Terry v. Ohio.2 In a
6 to 3 decision, the Court held that information
furnished in person by an informant who was
known to the officer, but whose record of reliability
was poor, justified the police officer's subsequent
approach and search of the suspect. This case
lowers the standard of reliability necessary for
information used to justify a stop and frisk, and
1407 U.S. 143 (1972).
Stop and frisk was first recognized and accepted in
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Until that case, police
were permitted to make arrest or searches without
warrants only when the facts within their knowledge
satisfied the fourth amendment requirement of prob-
able cause. Id. at 37. Terry allowed the "stop and frisk"
of a suspect by a police officer who personally observed
conduct which, in light of his experience, led him to
believe that criminal activity could be imminent and
that the persons involved might be armed and danger-
ous. The Court noted that whether such action is called
"stop and frisk" or "search and seizure," it is within
the purview of the fourth amendment and added that
the inquiry under the fourth amendment is the "rea-
sonableness in all the circumstances." Id. at 17-19.
Whether or not the officer's conduct was reasonable is
determined by comparing the need to search or seize
with the invasion the search or seizure entails. Id. at 21.
In sum, District Court and Gelbard indicate that
the Supreme Court interprets Title III as strictly
limiting the use of electronic surveillance tech-
niques. Failure to comply with the prior judicial
review provisions of Title III results in illegal
surveillance even in a domestic security situation.
In fact, District Court indicates that if there is
any area in which, warrantless wiretaps will be
upheld, that area is very narrow and is perhaps
confined to the President's exercise of his power
to protect the nation from foreign adversaries.
Gelbard holds -that at least where the trial court
determines that the surveillance was illegal, the
Court will expand Alderman outside the criminal
area. A grand jury witness charged with civil
contempt may invoke a §2515 defense that the
testimony requested is derived from the illegal
interception of his conversations.
defense to the charge, but the government indicated
that there must be some credible evidence that the
prosecution violated the law before ponderous judicial
machinery is involved to delay grand jury proceedings.
extends the stop and frisk concept to purely pos-
sessory crimes.
At about 2:15 A.M., in a high crime area of
Bridgeport, Connecticut, an officer was approached
by an informant "known" to him.3 The informant
told him that a person (Williams), sitting alone in
the front passenger seat of a nearby parked auto,
was in possession of narcotics, and had a handgun
in his waistband. The officer approached the car
and told the occupant to open the door. When
instead, Williams rolled down the window, the
officer immediately reached inside the car and
pulled a loaded revolver from the man's waistband.
The gun was not visible to the officer outside th.e
car, but he found it in precisely the place the in-
former had told him it would be.4 Williams was
immediately placed under arrest for illegal pos-
session of a revolver.5 A search of his person inci-
dent to that arrest produced a quantity of heroin.
In the auto a machete and second revolver were
3The officer was personally acquainted with the
informant, who remained unnamed. The officer also
knew the informant's poor history of reliability. See
note 13 infra.
'407 U.S. at 145.5Id.
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discovered,' and Williams was subsequently con-
victed of illegal possession of weapons and nar-
cotics. In an en banc reconsideration of Williams'
habeas corpus appeal, the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals ruled that the officer had neither prob-
able cause to arrest Williamb, nor sufficient cause
for reaching into his waistband. The Supreme
Court reversed.
Stop and frisk was first recognized in Terry v.
Ohio.8 The Terry Court in an 8-1 decision,9 held
that if an officer observes unusual conduct which
reasonably leads him to suspect criminal activity,
he may stop the individual for further investiga-
tion, even though there is no probable cause for
-a search or arrest. In addition, Terry held that if
in the process of such an investigation the officer
has reasonable grounds to fear for his or bystand-
ers' immediate safety he may search the suspect
solely for the protective purpose of discovering
weapons. ° Such a stop and frisk procedure, the
Court held, would not violate the fourth amend-
ment."
The basic question which separated the majority
and the dissenters in Adams was whether or not
the officer had information which was reliable
enough to proceed to investigate the suspect.
6Id.
7Williams v. Adams, 441 F.2d 394 (2d Cir. 1971).
The opinion of Judge Friendly, which Justice Brennan
quoted with approval, is found in the earlier panel
opinion which had upheld the conviction. See Williams
v. Adams, 43f F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1970).
8 392 U.S. 1 (1968). A veteran member of the police
force observed Terry and his companions behaving
suspiciously. He first saw Terry, then another man,
make several short walks in front of a jewelry store.
Each time each man paused and looked into the
window. The officer, believing that a robbery was being
planned, approached and asked them for their names.
Receiving only a mumbled answer, he immediately
"patted down" Terry's outer clothing and discovered a
pistol. Terry was arrested and subsequently convicted
of carrying a concealed weapon. 392 U.S. at 4-7.
9 Justice Douglas was the only dissenter. Id. at 35.
He argued that the majority had upheld a search which
, as not based on probable cause, thereby seriously
threatening fourth amendment liberties. See note 11
infra. The majority in Terry expressly acknowledged
that they were not concerned with probable cause, but
rather only with the "reasonableness" of the officers
actions. 392 U.S. at 20-22.
10 Id. at 30.
" U.S. CONsT. amend. IV:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the per-
sons or things to be seized.
His suspicion, whether justified or not, was based
almost entirely upon the informant's information 2
Thus, the dispute centered around whether an
informant, whose previous information had not
led to arrests," could alone provide sufficient justi-
fication for the initial stop of the suspect.
Justice Rchnquist, writing for the Court, held
that the information was sufficient to justify the
stop. His reliance on the informant's credibility
contrasts sharply with earlier Supreme Court
cases regarding informants and the weight to be
given their information in establishing probable
cause for search or arrest' The opinion recognized
this contrast,15 but refused to accept the earlier
cases as controlling. Adams did not involve the
establishment of probable cause, but rather the
establishment of a "reasonable suspicion." 16 Thus,
the Court did not feel bound by cases which de-
scribed the degree of credibility required of an
informant to establish probable cause. Adams is
a clear and unprecedented statement that informa-
tion given by an informer of questionable relia-
bility may, under certain circumstances, justify
a stop and frisk.
Justice Rehnquist's opinion indicates what those
circumstances are. First, Rehnquist noted that
the informant was known personally to the officer.
However, Terry's requirement that the officer be
able to produce articulate reasons to support his
The incident took place in a high crime area at
2:15 A.M. These facts may have affected the officer's
suspicions. 407 U.S. at 144.
" The informant had earlier reported homosexual
activity at a local railroad station, but subsequent
investigation had produced no "substantiating evi-
dence." Id. at 156 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
14The issue of reliability of an informant has been
considered in many Supreme Court decisions. Aguilar v.
Texas, 278 U.S. 108, 114 (1964), held that an affidavit,
based solely on the hearsay report of an unidentified
informant, must set forth "some of the underlying
circumstances from which the officer concluded that
the informant was 'credible' or his information 'reli-
able.'" In Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410(1969), the Court rejected an affidavit which did .not
sufficiently state the circumstances from which the
offiicer drew his conclusions. In United States v. Harris,
403 U.S. 573 (1971), an affidavit was held to establish
probable cause, even though it did not assert that the
informant had been previously reliable, since the Court
felt other information established the likelihood that
his information was correct.Is407 T ' ... ,,-
1 "Reasonable suspicion" has become the term
commonly used to describe a situation in which an
officer justifiably suspects criminal activity, but the
suspicion is not based on enough information to consti-
tute probable cause. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 37
(1968).
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suspicion 17 is weakened by the Court's faith in an
officer's intuitive evaluation of someone he knows.
Since "articulate" reasons are the means by which
a court may judge whether a stop and frisk was
-reasonable, Adams has made it more difficult for
the court to distinguish a proper stop and frisk
from an improper one.
Secondly, Rehnquist indicated the informant
had provided information in the past. Rehnquist
does not mention that the information had not
been subsequently verified." That should not only
preclude reliance on the informant, but provide an
additional reason for not relying on his information.
Thirdly, the Justice noted that the informant
came forward personally and that he would, under
Connecticut law, be subject to arrest if his in-
formation proved incorrect.'9 These two facts
together seemingly justify more reliance on the
informant than, for example, a telephone tip, or
an informant who appears personally but has no
reason to fear if his information is incorrect.
Finally, it was pointed out that the information
was immediately verifiable. There would seem
to be no reason, however, to assume that imine-
diately verifiable information is more accurate
than other information, unless the informant
knows that he will be arrested if proven wrong.
Therefore, this reason for the Court's reliance is
actually a reiteration of the previous reason-an
informant's fear of immediate arrest if he is in
error.
The fear that stop and frisk could easily be
abused generated concern in this case,2" as it did
prior to Terry.2' The fear in Adams arises primarily
because the case applies the stop and frisk concept
to purely possessory crimes. The dissent fears
that under Adams a search for contraband may
become the reason for the stop, instead of inci-
17Id. at 21. Furthermore, mere good faith on the
part of the officer has been held not to justify his
actions; if it did the "protections of the Fourth Amend-
ment would evaporate." Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 97
(1964).8 See note 13, supra.
19CoN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §53-168 (West 1958)
provides that any person who knowingly makes a false
report to the police alleging that a crime has been
committed is guilty of a misdemeanor.
20 407 U.S. at 162.
For an excellent expression of that fear, as well as
arguments which defend stop and frisk against such
fears, see the amici curiae briefs filed in Terry, reprinted
in II CAsEs Am CommNTs ON CamuwA. JusTIcE
399 (3d ed. F. Inban, J. Thompson & C. Sowle, 1968).
See also Schwartz, Stop-and-Frisk (A Case Study in
Judicial Control of the Police), 58 J. Carpj. L.C. & P.S.
433 (1967).
dental to it in order to protect the officer." Adams,
however, expressly reaffirms that the search must
be protective in origin, and contingent upon the
legitimacy of the stop.2' Hence, the fear expressed
by the dissent is primarily a fear that the courts
will not be able to detect cases in which the officer
used stop and frisk merely as an excuse to search
for contraband. Courts on all levels, however,
have successfully detected arrests made only to
justify a search, and have held them invalid.24
Presumably, if courts can detect such arrests, they
can also detect the stop and frisk used only to just-
ify a search. The officer who relies on stop and frisk
to legitimize his actions must be able to "point
to specific and articulable facts which, taken to-
gether with rational inferences from these facts,
reasonably warrant the intrusion." 2 5
Justice Marshall argues in his dissent that even
if the stop and frisk were proper (which he does
not concede), the Court has permitted an arrest
without a showing of probable cause.' 6 At the in-
stant prior to the arrest the officer had verified
part of the informant's information by actual
discovery of the gun. However, at that time carry-
ing a pistol was legal in Connecticut if the owner
had a permit," and the informer had not indicated
that the gun was possessed illegally. Therefore
there was no probable cause to arrest Williams
for illegal gun possession.
Assuming, however, that the stop and frisk was
legal, there is justification for holding that probable
cause existed for arrest for possession of narcotics.
Since the informer's information had been partially
"There are other reasons why the officer may be
tempted to execute a search without justifiable cause:
the officer may be tempted to search almost at random
in an overzealous desire to confiscate weapons in high
crime areas, the search may be used by the officer to
maintain his authority over local juvenile gangs or
other frequent trouble makers, or a bigoted officer may
be tempted to use the search as a means to vent his
hatred. See Schwartz, supra note 21, at 444.
So long as the officer is entitled to make a forcible
stop, and has reason to believe the suspect is armed
and dangerous, he may conduct a search limited
in scope to this protective purpose.
407 U.S. at 146.
21 See, e.g., United States v. One 1963 Cadillac
Hardtop, 224 F. Supp. 210, 212 (E.D. Wis. 1963),
stating that if the arrest is a sham or front for making
a search, the arrest and ensuing search are illegal. Cf.
United States v. Lassoff, 147 F. Supp. 944 (E.D. Ky.
1957), Williams v. State, 6 Md. App. 511, 252 A.2d
262 (1969), Williams v. United States, 418 F.2d 159
(9th Cir. 1969), af'd, 401 U.S. 646 (1971).
2" Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 21.
28 407 U.S. at 160-61.
2CoNN. GEN. STAT. AsN. §29-35 & §29-38 (West
1958).
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